Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Excess Benefit Transactions and Intermediate Sanctions: Determining Reasonable Compensation


Texas charter schools are no strangers to regulation.  In addition to the myriad of rules and requirements that must be followed to maintain their charter agreement with the State of Texas, the charter holder of a Texas open enrollment charter school is a 501(c)(3) public charity and must maintain 501(c)(3) exempt status as a condition to keeping the open enrollment charter.  Thus, it is necessary for charter leaders to be as informed about IRS regulations as much as any other area of charter regulation.

One area of particular concern and continued focus by the IRS are the  intermediate sanctions rules under Section 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code regarding excess benefit transactions. What might at first sound like total bafflegab, the intermediate sanction rules on excess benefit transactions actually set forth the basic rules and roadmap on how the board of directors of a charter school, or any public charity, should handle a transaction with an interested party, and provides a simple roadmap of compliance not only for IRS purposes, but also conflict of interest rules generally.

Simply put, an interested party may not be overpaid or enriched at the expense of the organization. A prohibited excess benefit transaction occurs when a public charity (or a 501(c)(4) organization) provides an economic benefit to a “disqualified person” and that benefit exceeds the fair value of the consideration received by the charity.  If an organization engages in an excess benefit transaction with a disqualified person, the regulations impose a penalty tax on the disqualified person – not the public charity – and any manager (board members included) who knowingly participated in the improper excess benefit.  A disqualified person must correct the excess benefit transaction by making a payment in cash or cash equivalents equal to the correction amount to the charity (plus interest) and paying a tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit amount. A manager who “knowingly” participated in the transaction would be liable for a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the excess benefit amount. A board member participating in the affirmative vote of the transaction by the board satisfies the “knowingly  participated” standard.

The penalty tax on the disqualified person gives rise to the name of the rules as “intermediate sanctions” as it is an “intermediate” sanction imposed by the IRS whereas previously, the only sanction available or a violation of private inurement was revocation of the organization’s tax-exempt status. However, it should be noted that while the excess benefit regulations  are the current  enforcement mechanism by the IRS for these types of transactions, the IRS retains the right to revoke an exempt organization’s status for violations of private inurement.

A “disqualified person” is defined broadly and includes any person who is in a position (including a five year look back period from the date of the transaction) to exert substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. The definition also includes family members of those that exert substantial influence over the organization, and an entity owned (at least 35% or more) by such person. For charter holders, this includes board members, officers, superintendents and other highly compensated managers, major contributors, and founders.

Nearly any transaction with a disqualified person qualifies as a transaction subject to the excess benefit transaction regulations. The most common form, and those often the subject of IRS scrutiny, include compensation and benefits to executives,  real property transfers, and the payment of personal expenses of executive employees. The standard of determining whether or not an excess benefit has occurred is one of reasonableness and fair market value. The regulations do not set forth any specific criteria for determining the reasonableness of compensation or the fair market value of property, and thus, an organization must rely on pre-existing tax law standards, particularly concerning fair market value determinations.

Instead, the regulations offer compliance procedures known as the “safe harbor rebuttable presumption procedures”.  If an organization follows these procedures,  the compensation to a disqualified person is presumed to be fair and reasonable and the burden shifts to the IRS to prove otherwise:

(i)            The Board approves the transaction in advance without the participation of the disqualified person;
(ii)          The Board obtains and relies upon appropriate comparability data; and
(iii)         The decision is appropriately and contemporaneously documented.

Appropriate comparability data in the case of compensation means obtaining data on similarly situated organizations for functionally comparable positions, including current compensation surveys compiled by independent firms and actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person.  For example, in determining the compensation of a school superintendent, the charter school would want to look at comparable salaries of other superintendents in Texas and the same city and county.  Ideally, data would be drawn from charter schools of a similar size and budget, but can also include data from private and public schools. While the regulations do not specify the amount of comparability data an organization should rely upon, it is clear that an organization with gross receipts over $1 million should, at a minimum, obtain more than 3 sources of comparability data.  

In the case of property, appropriate comparability data includes current (at the time of transfer) independent appraisals, market reports, and offers received as part of an open and competitive bidding process.

Putting the rebuttable presumption procedures into practice is not difficult and will safeguard not only against excess benefit transactions, but conflicts of interest generally. Organizations seeking to comply with the safe harbor rebuttable presumption procedures often make the mistake of not gathering appropriate comparability data sufficiently in advance of the board decision regarding the transaction, and do not “adequately and contemporaneously” document, in the minutes of the board, the procedures taken by the board (including documenting the comparability data relied upon) to ensure that the organization receives the benefit of the presumption of reasonableness. The minutes of a board decision will be the only evidence demonstrating whether or not a board has complied with the safe harbor procedures, and thus, charter school leaders should ensure that board minutes are properly and adequately recorded. It is also advisable that the safe harbor procedures be incorporated into a written conflict of interest policy that is easy to follow so that identifying and addressing conflicts through proper procedures becomes routine practice for the board of directors.

Lindsey B. Jones
Of Counsel
Schulman, Lopez & Hoffer, LLP